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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Andrew Scott Gomez was arrested for possession of a controlled substance
following the police’s search of a parked car in which Mr. Gomez was the driver and
Jennifer Thompson was the passenger. Methamphetamine was found in a makeup bag
on the passenger side of the car and on Ms. Thompson in her bra. The police also
found a backpack with marijuana in the trunk. No methamphetamine or paraphernalia
was found on Mr. Gomez or in the driver’s side of the car. Nevertheless, Mr. Gomez
was arrested for constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine.
At the county jail, Mr. Gomez admitted to having a pipe in his underwear, which
had a very small amount of methamphetamine residue. The State charged Mr. Gomez
with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was
not charged with possession of marijuana. Mr. Gomez proceeded to trial. The jury found
him guilty as charged. Mr. Gomez appeals.
Mr. Gomez asserts three errors on appeal. First, he contends the evidence was
insufficient

to

establish

his

constructive

possession

of

Ms.

Thompson’s

methamphetamine. Second, he argues the district court erred by failing to instruct the
jury that it had to unanimously agree on the specific occurrence giving rise to the
possession of methamphetamine charge. Third, he submits the district court erred by
admitting evidence of the backpack of marijuana. Due to these errors, Mr. Gomez
respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s judgment of conviction and
remand this case for a new trial.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Complaint alleging Mr. Gomez committed the crimes of
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine and/or amphetamine, in
violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a pipe, in violation
of I.C. § 37-2734A. (R., pp.6–7.) The allegations arose out of a police officer’s
investigation of a parked car behind a shopping center at approximately 2:00 a.m.
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.6, L.11–p.8, L.11.) Mr. Gomez was in the driver’s seat, and
Ms. Thompson was in the passenger’s seat. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.8, L.12–16.) After a
drug dog alert, the police searched the car and found a zip-up pouch with
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on the passenger side. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex.,
p.35, L.22–p.38, L.6.) A backpack containing marijuana was found in the trunk. (Prelim.
Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.38, Ls.14–21.) The police also found a very small amount of
methamphetamine and paraphernalia in Ms. Thompson’s purse and a baggie of
methamphetamine in her bra. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.13, Ls.1–24, p.26, Ls.18–22.)
Mr. Gomez was arrested and taken to the Ada County Jail. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.19,
Ls.9–13.) At the jail, the police found a pipe with a small amount of residue, which
tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine, in Mr. Gomez’s underwear.
(Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.19, L.22–p.20, L.12.)
At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for possession
of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, and Mr. Gomez was bound
over to district court. (Prelim. Hr’g Tr. Ex., p.43, L.23–p.44, L.23; R., pp.16, 1720–22.)
The

State

filed

an

Information

charging
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Mr.

Gomez

with

possession

of

methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 (R., pp.23–24.) The
Information did not specify which methamphetamine Mr. Gomez allegedly possessed.
Mr. Gomez was not charged with possession of marijuana. The State later filed an
Information Part II charging Mr. Gomez as a persistent violator. (R., pp.28–29.)
Mr. Gomez pled not guilty, and the case was set for trial. (R., p.27.)
Prior to trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to introduce evidence of the
marijuana found in the vehicle’s trunk and Mr. Gomez’s statements about the marijuana
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b). (R., pp.78–79.) The district court held a hearing,
and Mr. Gomez objected to the admission of the marijuana evidence. (Tr. Vol. I, 2 p.43,
Ls.13–21.) The district court reserved ruling on the marijuana evidence until trial in order
to have “a bit more offer of proof.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.44, Ls.13–24.) Then, on the morning of
trial, the district court ruled the marijuana evidence was admissible, even though the
State provided no additional offer of proof. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.11–12, Ls.15–20.)
At trial, the State presented evidence of more than one act of possession to
support the possession of methamphetamine charge. Initially, Boise Police Officer
McCarthy testified that suspected methamphetamine was found on Ms. Thompson, in
her purse, and on the passenger side of the car in a makeup bag (the zip-up pouch).
(Tr. Vol. II, p.101, L.21–p.102, L.8.) There was no further evidence, however, on the
testing of the suspected methamphetamine found in Ms. Thompson’s purse. (See
Tr. Vol. II, p.133, Ls.20–23 (Officer McCarthy stating he searched Ms. Thompson’s

At the start of the preliminary hearing, the State filed an Amended Complaint changing
“methamphetamine and/or amphetamine” to methamphetamine only. (R., pp.16, 18–
19.)
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purse), p.164, Ls.3–6 (Officer McCarthy stating there was a bag in Ms. Thompson’s
purse).) Rather, the State focused on the suspected methamphetamine found on
Ms. Thompson and in the makeup bag. Officer Green, who found the makeup bag,
conducted a NIK test of the crystalline substance inside, which tested presumptively
positive for methamphetamine, and a forensic scientist with ISP opined that the
substance was methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.114, L.2–p.115, L.24, p.117, Ls.5–21,
p.135, L.19–p.137, L.19, p.180, Ls.4–11.) Officer Newell, who searched Ms. Thompson,
found the baggie of suspected methamphetamine in Ms. Thompson’s bra. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.122, L.8–p.123, L.6.) Officer Newell did not conduct a NIK test, but the ISP forensic
scientist opined that the substance was also methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.135,
L.19–p.137, L.19, p.179, L.19–p.180, L.3; see also State’s Ex. 3, Item 3 and 4.)
Separate from the methamphetamine found on Ms. Thompson and in the
makeup bag, Officer McCarthy testified that Mr. Gomez admitted at the jail to having a
“meth pipe” in his underwear. (Tr. Vol. II, p.150, Ls.5–16.) It was a “pretty clean looking
pipe” with a “very faint burnt white residue.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.154, Ls.8–15.) Officer
McCarthy used a paper clip to scrape out the residue for a NIK test, which tested
presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.155, Ls.1–22.) The ISP
forensic scientist opined that the pipe had a very small amount of methamphetamine
residue. (Tr. Vol. II, p.182, L.7–p.187, L.3, p.189, L.7–p.192, L.10.)

There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains a motion to
suppress hearing and a pretrial conference. The second, cited as Volume II, contains
the trial and sentencing.
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In addition, an audio recording of the stop also admitted at trial. (Tr. Vol. II, p.91,
L.21–p.93, L.3, p.151, Ls.12–21; see State’s Ex. 2.3) Likewise, Officer McCarthy
testified regarding the statements made by Mr. Gomez during the investigation. He
testified that, during the search, Mr. Gomez denied “any knowledge of the items that
were found.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.144, L.24–p.145, L.12.) Officer McCarthy explained that
Mr. Gomez told him that he met Ms. Thompson at a friend’s house. (Tr. Vol. II, p.145,
L.24–p.146, L.6; see also State’s Ex. 2, 10:40–10:50.) Mr. Gomez agreed to give
Ms. Thompson a ride in exchange for some “crystal,” which was “street lingo” for
methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.145, L.24–p.146, L.18; see also State’s Ex. 2, 18:00–
18:15, 27:30–27:36.) Mr. Gomez told Officer McCarthy that he went to a friend’s house
where Mr. Gomez, Ms. Thompson, and her friends “all smoked methamphetamine
together.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.146, L.19–p.147, L.2; see also State’s Ex. 2, 27:01–27:12.)
Mr. Gomez also told the police Ms. Thompson told him she had a “40,” but he continued
to deny knowledge of the other methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.144, L.24–p.145, L.12,
p.148, L.17–p.149, L.7, p.161, Ls.8–23; see also State’s Ex. 2, 28:18–28:25.)
The State also presented evidence of the marijuana at trial. Officer McCarthy
testified that he found the backpack of suspected marijuana in the vehicle. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.144, Ls.14–23.) Officer McCarthy also testified that Mr. Gomez told him he had to take
Ms. Thompson to a Jack in the Box to pick up some of her belongings before he gave
her the ride. (Tr. Vol. II, p.147, Ls.3–18.) They picked up the backpack of suspected
marijuana at the Jack in the Box, and the backpack was found by the police in the trunk.

The audio recording was admitted as the State’s Exhibit 2, see Tr. Vol. II, p.91, L.21–
p.92, L.25, but later on the audio recording is inadvertently referred to as State’s Exhibit
1, see Tr. Vol. II, p.151, Ls.12–21. It will be cited herein as “State’s Ex. 2.”

3
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(Tr. Vol. II, p.147, L.19–p.148, L.1.) Further, Officer McCarthy questioned Mr. Gomez
regarding the marijuana during his investigation, which the jury heard in the audio
recording. (See State’s Ex. 2, 20:08–26:26.) In the audio recording, Officer McCarthy
tells Mr. Gomez that Ms. Thompson claimed the backpack belonged to him, but
Mr. Gomez repeatedly denies knowledge and possession of the marijuana. (See State’s
Ex. 2, 20:08–26:26.) Mr. Gomez explained to Officer McCarthy that he took
Ms. Thompson to pick up her belongings from a friend at the Jack in the Box and, while
at the Jack in the Box, Ms. Thompson got a backpack from “some guy in a red truck,”
which she put in the trunk. (See State’s Ex. 2, 20:08–26:26.)
In its closing statement, the State argued to the jury the multiple theories in which
it alleged Mr. Gomez possessed methamphetamine. (Tr. Vol. II, p.218, L.17–22.) The
State asserted Mr. Gomez was guilty: (1) by admitting to smoking methamphetamine
earlier with Ms. Thompson; (2) due to the methamphetamine found in the makeup bag
and on Ms. Thompson; and (3) by having the pipe with a traceable residue in his
underwear. (Tr. Vol. II, p.219, L.11–p.221, L.9.) The jury was instructed on actual and
constructive possession. (R., p.108.)
The jury found Mr. Gomez guilty of possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.116–17.) Mr. Gomez admitted to the
persistent violator enhancement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.229, L.9–p.233, L.2.) The district court
sentenced Mr. Gomez to ten years, with two years fixed, for possession of
methamphetamine. (R., pp.120–22.) Mr. Gomez filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the
district court’s Judgment and Commitment. (R., pp.126–27.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the State present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
Mr. Gomez’s constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine?

2.

Did the district court err when it failed to give a unanimity instruction for the
possession of methamphetamine charge?

3.

Did the district court err when it admitted evidence of the backpack of marijuana?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Mr. Gomez’s Constructive Possession Of Ms. Thompson’s Methamphetamine
A.

Introduction
The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Gomez had

constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. Specifically, the State
failed to prove the element of control because the evidence showed Ms. Thompson, not
Mr. Gomez, had control over the methamphetamine in her bra and makeup bag.
B.

Standard Of Review
In State v. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173 (Ct. App. 2014), the Court of Appeals

outlined the appellate standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence:
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in
scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have
found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera–Brito,
131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104
(Ct. App. 1991). We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact
as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684 (Ct. App.
1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution. Herrera–Brito, 131 Idaho at 385; Knutson, 121 Idaho at
104. Substantial evidence may exist even when the evidence presented is
solely circumstantial or when there is conflicting evidence. Severson, 147
Idaho at 712; State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 50–51 (1969). In fact, even
when circumstantial evidence could be interpreted consistently with a
finding of innocence, it will be sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it
also gives rise to reasonable inferences of guilt. Severson, 147 Idaho at
712; State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 199, 203 (Ct. App.
1993).
158 Idaho at 177–78.
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C.

The Evidence Was Insufficient For Constructive Possession Because The State
Failed To Prove Mr. Gomez’s Control Over Ms. Thompson’s Methamphetamine
To prove possession of a controlled substance, the State must show the act of

possession and “the knowledge that one is in possession of the substance.” State v.
Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926 (1993). “Possession of a controlled substance may be actual
or constructive. When the accused is not in actual physical possession the State must
show that he had such knowledge and control of the substance as to establish
constructive possession.” State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706 (Ct. App. 1994). For
constructive possession, “knowledge and control of the controlled substance must each
be independently proven beyond a reasonable doubt by either circumstantial or direct
evidence.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 178. Moreover, “[w]here joint occupancy [of a
vehicle] is involved,” “constructive possession cannot be inferred from the mere fact that
the defendant occupied, with a passenger, the vehicle in which the drugs were seized.”
Id. “[S]ubstantial evidence must exist establishing the guilt of each defendant, not
merely the collective guilt of both; proximity alone will not suffice as proof of
possession.” Id. The State must prove the defendant “was not simply a bystander but,
rather, had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control over the substance.”
Id. “Circumstantial evidence, other than the mere fact of possession, may be used to
find the requisite knowledge and control.” Id.
Here, the State failed to present any evidence Mr. Gomez had control over the
methamphetamine on Ms. Thompson or in the makeup bag. In State v. Burnside, the
Court of Appeals held the evidence was insufficient to show the defendant’s dominion
and control over the contraband, even though the defendant may have had prior control
over the contraband. 115 Idaho 882, 885–86 (Ct. App. 1989). In Burnside, the police
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searched a vehicle recently occupied by the defendant and a passenger. Id. at 883,
885. The police located psilocybin mushrooms in a black bag in the vehicle. Id. The
defendant told the police the black bag was not his. Id. at 885. However, the evidence
suggested the defendant may have sold the mushrooms to the passenger hours earlier
in a motel room, and the passenger declared ownership of the mushrooms. Id. Based
on these facts, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant’s prior sale of the
mushrooms “may have indicated that he possessed the drugs at an earlier time, but it
does not establish that he continued to possess them after the sale was consummate.”
Id. at 885–86. “The natural inference,” the Court of Appeals explained, was that the
passenger, “having purchased the drugs, was the one who possessed them at the time
they were found by the police.” Id. at 886. The defendant “would have surrendered his
right of possession upon receiving payment.” Id. Further, the Court of Appeals noted
that the defendant’s denial of the black bag and the prior drug sale went to knowledge,
but neither fact established control. Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the
evidence was insufficient to show the defendant’s control of the mushrooms. Id.
The inverse factual scenario occurred here, but the same lack of control is
present. The evidence showed Mr. Gomez and Ms. Thompson had an agreement for
Mr. Gomez to receive methamphetamine in exchange for Ms. Thompson’s ride, but the
exchange never took place. (See Tr. Vol II, p.76, Ls.14–22, p.78, L.22–p.79, L1, p.219,
L.18–p.220, L.3, p.221, Ls.5–8.) Mr. Gomez did not give Ms. Thompson the ride, and
Ms. Thompson never gave Mr. Gomez the methamphetamine. Just as the defendant’s
past sale of mushrooms did not establish control in Burnside, Mr. Gomez’s future
receipt of the methamphetamine does not establish his control here. At the time of the

10

alleged offense, Ms. Thompson had exclusive control over the methamphetamine.4
Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence of Mr. Gomez’s “power and
intent to exercise dominion and control” over the methamphetamine on Ms. Thompson
and in the makeup bag. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 178.
Due

to

the

insufficient

evidence

for

constructive

possession

of

methamphetamine, the jury verdict is invalid. Although generally a jury verdict may be
upheld if only one of multiple factual means is not supported by sufficient evidence,
Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182–83, the multiple means of possession here were not
alternative factual grounds, but rather multiple incidents of criminal conduct. See Part
II.C. The jury was not given a unanimity instruction, however, and the State never
elected a particular theory. Without a unanimity instruction, the jury could have conflated
the multiple incidents of criminal conduct to reach a verdict based on the supported
element of one incident and the unsupported element of another incident. See Part II.C–
D. It is not possible to determine if the jury reached the verdict on an unsupported
theory. See State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 301 (2000) (“In cases where it is not possible
to determine if the jury reached the verdict on the correct or incorrect legal theory, this
Court must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a new trial.”). Therefore, as

In the audio recording of the investigation, admitted at trial, Officer McCarthy says to
Mr. Gomez that Ms. Thompson told him that Mr. Gomez “shoved the sunglasses case
full of meth in her bra.” (State’s Ex. 2, 24:04–24:12.) Mr. Gomez denied this, and he
also denied that he already got the methamphetamine from Ms. Thompson and had
given it back to her. (State’s Ex. 2, 24:12–24:30.) There was no evidence at trial on the
truth of the matter asserted in Officer McCarthy’s statement or on the actual statements
made by Ms. Thompson during the investigation. Besides Officer McCarthy’s hearsay
statement, the State presented no evidence regarding Mr. Gomez’s physical possession
of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine. As explored in Part II, the State relied on a
constructive possession theory.

4
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discussed in Part II.D, the insufficient evidence for one of the theories of possession
coupled with absence of unanimity instruction requires that the judgment of conviction
be vacated and this case remanded for a new trial.
II.
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Give A Unanimity Instruction For The
Possession Of Methamphetamine Charge
A.

Introduction
The State presented more than one means of possession of methamphetamine

to the jury. Indeed, the State alleged three separate means of possession, two actual
and one constructive. Faced with three distinct acts, the jury should have been
instructed it must unanimously agree on the specific incident constituting the charged
offense. Although Mr. Gomez did not submit a proposed unanimity instruction, he
asserts the district court’s failure to give this instruction was fundamental error.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which

[the Court] exercise[s] free review. When reviewing jury instructions, [the Court] ask[s]
whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect
applicable law.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 181 (citations omitted).
C.

The District Court Erred By Failing To Give A Unanimity Instruction Because The
State Alleged Separate, Discrete Acts Of Possession Of Methamphetamine
“Idaho law requires a trial court to instruct a jury that, in order to convict a

defendant, it must unanimously agree on the defendant’s guilt.” State v. Adamcik, 152
Idaho 445, 474 (2012) (citing State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 711 (2009)); see also

12

I.C. §§ 19-2316, -2317; I.C.R. 31. As a general rule, the district court is not required to
instruct the jury that “it must unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense.”
Severson, 147 Idaho at 711. But there is an “important exception” to this general rule.
Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 474–75. If the defendant “commits several acts, each of which
would independently support a conviction for the crime charged,” the district court must
instruct the jury “that it must unanimously agree on the specific occurrence giving rise to
the offense.” Severson, 147 Idaho at 711. A unanimity instruction is required “regardless
of whether the defendant requests such an instruction.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 181–
82.
The test to determine if the alleged criminal conduct constitutes “separate,
distinct and independent” crimes involves two inquiries. State v. Major, 111 Idaho 410,
414 (1986) (quoting State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69 (1963)). The Court must consider “the
circumstances of the conduct” and “the intent and objective of the actor.” Id.; see also
Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182. The actor’s intent and objective is “of particular
importance in cases of crimes of possession, which involve knowledge or awareness of
control over something rather than an act or omission to act.” Major, 111 Idaho at 414
(citing W AYNE R. LAFAVE, HANDBOOK

ON

CRIMINAL LAW § 25, p. 182 (1972)). In a drug

possession case, the Court of Appeals referenced the dual inquiry above, but also
described the test as “whether there was ‘a distinct union of mens rea and actus reus
separated by a discrete period of time and circumstance from any other such similar
incident’ for each of the alleged acts of possession.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182
(quoting Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268 (Ct. App. 2000)).
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In Southwick, for example, the Court of Appeals held that a unanimity instruction
was not required in a drug possession case because the record did not show separate
periods of time or circumstances for the two alleged acts of possession. Id. at 182. The
defendant was charged with a single count of possession of a controlled substance “on
a single date, at a single time, and in a single location.” Id. The criminal complaint did
not specify the means of possession. Id. At trial, the State presented evidence of two
means of possession: (1) methamphetamine residue on a scale found between the
driver and passenger seats of a vehicle and (2) a baggie of methamphetamine found in
the passenger side door. Id. at 177, 182. Both of these items were found during a
search of the vehicle after a traffic stop. Id. at 177. The Court of Appeals reasoned that
the two alleged acts occurred at the same time and in the same location, and the
precise place where the methamphetamine was stored in the vehicle was not
dispositive. Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded the two acts of possession were
alternative factual means, “not multiple incidents of criminal conduct.” Id.
In contrast to Southwick, the State here alleged separate, distinct, and
independent crimes of possession. This case did not involve alternative factual means,
but rather multiple incidents of criminal conduct. The State alleged Mr. Gomez
possessed three varied quantities of methamphetamine in different locations and at
different times. First, the State claimed Mr. Gomez possessed a traceable amount of
methamphetamine residue on the pipe in his underwear. (Tr. Vol. II, p.78, Ls.3–16,
p.79, Ls.2–3, p.150, L.1–p.158, L.11, p.182, L.7–p.188, L.22, p.220, Ls.4–25, p.221,
Ls.8–9, p.222, Ls.14–20.) Second, the State claimed Mr. Gomez possessed some other
unknown quantity of methamphetamine based solely on his admission that he smoked
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methamphetamine earlier. (Tr. Vol. II, p.78, Ls.20–22, p.146, L.19–p.147, L.11, p.219,
Ls.11–17, p.221, Ls. 1–3.) Third, the State claimed Mr. Gomez constructively
possessed some portion of either the 20.5 grams of methamphetamine found on
Ms. Thompson or the 3 grams in her makeup bag. (Tr. Vol. II, p.114, L.2–p.115, L.24,
p.117, Ls.5–21, p.122, L.8–p.123, L.6, p.135, L.19–p.137, L.19, p.179, L.19–p.180,
L.11, p.146, Ls.7–18.) For this third occurrence, the State argued Mr. Gomez
possessed the methamphetamine because he was going to get some “crystal” in
exchange for the ride he was going to give Ms. Thompson. (Tr. Vol. II, p.76, Ls.14–22,
p.78, L.22–p.79, L1, p.219, L.18–p.220, L.3, p.221, Ls.5–8.) In total, the State alleged
three means of possession: the traceable residue in the pipe, the unknown quantity of
methamphetamine just prior to smoking it, and Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine.
These were all separate, discrete acts in different locations with varied amounts, each
of which would independently support a conviction for the charged offense. 5 Moreover,
two of the occurrences relied on an actual possession theory, while one occurrence
relied on a constructive possession theory. “[T]he circumstances of the conduct” and
“the intent and objective of the actor” are different for actual and constructive
possession. See Major, 111 Idaho at 414; see also State v. King, 878 P.2d 466, 468–69
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding unanimity instruction required when the State’s
evidence showed two distinct instances of drug possession “occurring at different times,
in different places, and involving two different containers”: constructive possession of

Mr. Gomez maintains, as argued in Part I, that his future control of the
methamphetamine on Ms. Thompson or in the makeup bag was insufficient to prove the
element of control and thus his constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s
methamphetamine.

5
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contraband in jointly occupied vehicle and actual possession of contraband on
defendant’s person during inventory search at jail). In light of the multiple incidents of
criminal conduct, a unanimity instruction was necessary to instruct the jury “that it must
unanimously agree on the specific occurrence giving rise to the offense.” Severson, 147
Idaho at 711; see also Southwick, 158 Idaho at 181–82.
Even if this Court determines that some of the acts were not separate and
discrete, the State’s reliance on Mr. Gomez’s admission to smoking methamphetamine
as one means in which to prove the charged offense required a unanimity instruction.
This alleged incident of actual possession occurred well before the police investigation
and search of the vehicle. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.146, L.19–p.147, L.2; see also State’s Ex.
2, 27:01–27:12.) There is nothing in the record linking this incident to the other two
alleged

acts.

Mr.

Gomez’s

admission

to

actual

possession

by

smoking

methamphetamine was “separated by a discrete period of time and circumstance” from
the alleged possession of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine and the residue in the
pipe. Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182 (quoting Miller, 135 Idaho at 268). Therefore, a
unanimity instruction was necessary to instruct the jury on the specific act giving rise to
the offense.
D.

The District Court’s Failure To Give A Unanimity Instruction Is Fundamental Error
Mr. Gomez did not object to the lack of a unanimity instruction at trial, so he must

satisfy the fundamental error standard to prevail on appeal. State v. Southwick, 158
Idaho 173, 181 (Ct. App. 2014). Under the fundamental error standard, the defendant
must show the error “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional
rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
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the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a
tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).
An error is not harmless “if there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the
outcome of the trial.” Id. at 226. Mr. Gomez meets all three prongs of this standard.
First, the lack of a unanimity instruction violated Mr. Gomez’s unwaived
constitutional rights to a unanimous jury verdict and to be free from double jeopardy.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part, “in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Article I, section 7 of the Idaho Constitution
states in part, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . . .” IDAHO CONST. art. I, §
7; see also I.C. §§ 19-2316, -2317; Idaho Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 31. This section
“guarantee[s] the right to a trial by jury, which means a jury which has not been misled
by erroneous instructions to a defendant’s prejudice . . . .” State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho
724, ___, 87 P.2d 454, 460 (1939). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is also implicated by a unanimity issue. As the Court explained in Major:
Whether a course of conduct constitutes one offense or several can be a
troublesome question. The distinction is important: to charge a defendant
with two offenses when only one was committed violates the defendant’s
right against double jeopardy, U.S. CONST. amend. V; IDAHO CONST. art. 1,
§ 13; conversely, to charge a defendant with one offense when more than
one was committed can prejudice the defendant “in the shaping of
evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than a unanimous
verdict as to each separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on
appeal, and in exposing the defendant to double jeopardy.” W AYNE R.
LAFAVE &, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.2(e), p.457 (1984).
111 Idaho at 414. Here, the jurors were not instructed to unanimously agree on a
specific criminal incident of possession, nor did the State elect a particular act on which
it would rely for the conviction. See State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 173 (Ct. App. 2004)
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(the State’s election of act to support each charged offense rendered unanimity
instruction unnecessary). Rather, the State argued multiple theories of possession to
the jury in its opening statement and closing argument. (Tr. Vol. II, p.78, L.17–p.79, L.3,
p.218, L.17–p.219, L.2, p.219, L.11–p.221, L.9.) The State claimed:
And there are from the State’s perspective and the State’s argument in
this case is that the defendant possessed methamphetamine in multiple
ways. Multiple types of conduct. [sic] However, I’m not required to prove
all of those to you. If you find that he possessed methamphetamine in one
of these ways, two of these ways or all of these ways, the State has met
its burden.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.218, L.19–p.219, L2.) The State also asserted, “[A]ny way you shake it,
any way you look at this, the defendant possessed methamphetamine.” (Tr. Vol. II,
p.227, Ls.1–3.) The jurors could reasonably conclude that they could find Mr. Gomez
guilty of possession of methamphetamine even if they disagreed on which of the
theories of possession were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Some jurors could find
Mr. Gomez actually possessed the traceable amount in the pipe, others could find he
constructively possessed Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine, and still others could find
he actually possessed methamphetamine at some unidentified place and time when he
smoked it. The absence of a unanimity instruction for the charged offense misled the
jury and thus deprived Mr. Gomez of his right to a unanimous jury verdict and his right
to be free from double jeopardy.
Second, the error plainly exists. The jury instructions are in the record, so there is
no need for additional information outside of the record. (R., pp.97–115.) Further, there
is no evidence the failure to object to the instructions or put forth a unanimity instruction
was a strategic decision. The right to a unanimous jury verdict in a felony criminal trial is
so fundamental to the citizens of Idaho that it has been expressed in both the

18

constitution and statutes. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; I.C. §§ 19-2316, -2317; I.C.R. 31.
Mr. Gomez gained no tactical advantage by allowing the jury to find him guilty based on
any of the three incidents of possession. Therefore, this error is clear and obvious from
the record.
Third, the error was not harmless. Mr. Gomez presented different defenses in
response to the State’s various theories of possession. For constructive possession,
Mr. Gomez argued he did not have control of Ms. Thompson’s methamphetamine
because he did not have any access or guarantee to receive it until after he gave her a
ride. (Tr. Vol. II, p.224, L.7–p.225, L.5.) For actual possession, Mr. Gomez argued the
traceable amount of methamphetamine in the pipe was so negligible he did not know it
was there. (Tr. Vol. II, p.225, Ls.9–25, p.226, Ls.4–6.) “[W]hen it appears that there is a
genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as the result of
different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different acts,” a specific
unanimity instruction is required. Gain, 140 Idaho at 172. Here, due to the State’s
various theories plus Mr. Gomez’s different defenses, the jury could have reached a
guilty verdict while disagreeing on the specific act of possession. See King, 878 P.2d at
469 (lack of unanimity instruction not harmless due to conflicting evidence of
constructive and actual possession). Thus, there is a reasonable possibility the absence
of a unanimity instruction affected the outcome of the trial.
Moreover, this error was not harmless because one of the State’s theories was
not supported by sufficient evidence. As argued in Part I, the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Gomez had constructive possession of Ms. Thompson’s
methamphetamine. Generally, reversal is not required “when one of the alternative
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factual means of meeting an element of the charged crime is not supported by sufficient
evidence.” Southwick, 158 Idaho at 182 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals
reasoned, “[I]f there are two possible factual grounds for the jury’s verdict, one
reasonable and the other unreasonable, we will assume, absent a contrary indication in
the record, that the jury based its verdict on the reasonable ground that is supported by
sufficient evidence.” Id. at 183 (emphasis added). Here, however, State alleged multiple
incidents of criminal conduct, not simply alternative factual grounds. It is reasonable to
conclude the jury found Mr. Gomez guilty based on a combination of elements from two
or more separate, discrete criminal incidents. See Luke, 134 Idaho at 301 (“In cases
where it is not possible to determine if the jury reached the verdict on the correct or
incorrect legal theory, this Court must vacate the conviction and remand the case for a
new trial.”). In light of the insufficient evidence, plus the State’s various theories, there is
a reasonable possibility the lack of a unanimity instruction affected the outcome of the
trial.
Because the district court’s failure to give a unanimity jury instruction clearly
violated Mr. Gomez’s constitutional rights to a fair trial and to be free of double jeopardy,
and because this error affect the outcome of the trial, Mr. Gomez submits that the
judgment of conviction should vacated and this case remanded for a new trial.

20

III.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Evidence Of The Backpack Of Marijuana
A.

Introduction
Mr. Gomez asserts the district court erred by admitting evidence of the backpack

of marijuana at trial. He raises two challenges to the district court’s evidentiary ruling.
First, he contends the State provided an inadequate offer of proof to show the evidence
was admissible. Second, even if the State’s offer of proof was adequate, Mr. Gomez
argues the evidence was not relevant for any proper purpose and should have been
excluded.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews questions regarding the admissibility of
evidence using a mixed standard of review. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho
139, 143 (2008). First, whether the evidence is relevant is a matter of law
that is subject to free review. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 569 (2007).
Second, [the Court] review[s] the district court’s determination of whether
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an
abuse of discretion. Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143.

State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015).
C.

The District Court Erred By Admitting The Marijuana Evidence Because, At The
Time Of Admission, It Was Not Relevant To Prove The Charge Of Possession Of
Methamphetamine
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.”
I.R.E. 404(b). The prohibition on other bad acts evidence “has its source in the common
law. The common law rule was that the doing of a criminal act, not part of the issue, is
not admissible as evidence of the doing of the criminal act charged.” State v. Grist, 147

21

Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This evidence of
prior misconduct ‘may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident . . . . ’” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8 (2013) (quoting I.R.E. 404(b)).
The Court applies to two-part standard when reviewing the district court’s
admission of other bad acts evidence. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 913. First, “whether, under
I.R.E. 404(b), the evidence is relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the
defendant's character or criminal propensity,” and second, “whether, under I.R.E. 403,
the district court abused its discretion in finding the probative value of the evidence was
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” Id.
(quoting Joy, 155 Idaho at 8).
“Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.’” State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2007)
(quoting I.R.E. 401). Under Rule 404(b), the evidence must be “relevant as a matter of
law to an issue other than the defendant’s character or propensity.” Ehrlick, 158 Idaho
at 913. It must be “relevant to the charged offense.” Id. (quoting Joy, 155 Idaho at 9).
“Reliance on an oral or written offer of proof in determining the admissibility of
Rule 404(b) evidence is one way that a district court can make the requisite initial
finding that a prior bad act is established as fact.” State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210, 215
(Ct. App. 2009). The district court “may also rely on affidavits, stipulations by the parties,
live testimony, or may hold more extensive evidentiary hearings for each witness in
advance of trial.” Id. “[I]n considering the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), a
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trial court must determine that there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
conclusion that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Id.
In this case, Mr. Gomez asserts the State’s written and oral offers of proof were
insufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that Mr. Gomez knew of the contents of
the backpack. Further, assuming the offer of proof was sufficient, Mr. Gomez asserts
evidence of marijuana was irrelevant to any element of charged offense of
methamphetamine. Each argument will be addressed in turn.
First, the State provided an insufficient offer of proof regarding Mr. Gomez’s
knowledge of the contents of the backpack. In the State’s written notice, the State
simply argued it “would introduce this evidence to directly prove an element of the crime
of possession of a controlled substance, to demonstrate knowledge, intent to possess,
preparation, plan, knowledge and/or the absence of mistake.” (R., p.79.) At the pre-trial
hearing, the State explained:
With respect to the 404(b) evidence that the State is requesting to
introduce at trial, there was a backpack full of marijuana located in the
trunk of the vehicle that the defendant was driving. The State doesn’t
actually intend to introduce the physical marijuana at trial, but the State is
requesting to introduce the fact that there was marijuana and a stop on
this kind of – this path that the defendant and [Ms. Thompson] took
throughout the night prior to their stop to pick up this marijuana that was in
the backpack.
And so the State intends to use the marijuana evidence to show
essentially lack of mistake and knowledge as to what exactly was going on
through this course of conduct. I would be happy to give the Court more
information if you need that.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.42, L.9–p.43, L.1.) Mr. Gomez objected:
With respect to the marijuana, Judge, it is not clear to me – well, the
defendant said to the officer right before he was being arrested that he
had no knowledge of what was in the backpack. And so we don’t believe
that that should be admissible as well it is also a prior bad act. I
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understand the State is wanting to introduce that to show knowledge, but it
is not clear to me that he had knowledge.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.43, Ls.12–21.) The district court reserved ruling on the marijuana evidence
until trial:
As to whatever else was found and what the stops were, I think it is
closely tied in time. I think it would be helpful at the time of trial to perhaps
provide a bit more information on the factual circumstances of that. I
mean, I know it was found when the car was searched. I also know from
having done a motion to suppress that he talked about borrowing the car
and he talked about being there to drive it. And so I think it would be
helpful to have a bit more offer of proof at the time of trial. So we will defer
to that.
(Tr. Vol. I, p.44, Ls.13–23.) The district court went on to add, “I think a little bit more
information on the State’s theory and the facts besides the fact that it was simply found
would be useful.” (Tr. Vol. I, p.45, Ls.1–4.) Then, on the morning of trial, without an
additional offer of proof from the State, the district court ruled the marijuana evidence
was admissible:
The issue of course is possession. It is all part of the same act, same
scene, and it is relevant and admissible. And I don’t think any prejudicial
effect outweighs its probative value. I think it is part of the entire picture in
this case. It is relevant to the issues brought before the jury.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.6, Ls.15–20.)
Considering the State’s offer of proof, the district court’s initial concerns
regarding the State’s offer of proof to establish the relevance of the marijuana were
valid. For example, in State v. Seitter, 127 Idaho 356 (1995), the Court held that bags of
unidentified white powder were not relevant to a charge of possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver because, at the time of admission, the State
offered no proof that the white powder contained cutting agents. Id. at 358. Here, the
State provided an insufficient offer of proof regarding Mr. Gomez’s knowledge of the
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contents of the backpack. At most, the State’s offer of proof indicated Mr. Gomez drove
Ms. Thompson to pick up the backpack, but no evidence showed Mr. Gomez knew what
was inside. Similarly, the State’s contention that Mr. Gomez drove Ms. Thompson to
pick up the backpack, with nothing more, does not show some kind of joint plan.
Besides conclusory remarks, the State provided no information on Mr. Gomez and
Ms. Thompson’s alleged “course of conduct.” (See Tr. Vol. I, p.42, L.9–p.43, L.1.)
Ultimately, the State failed to show the marijuana evidence was relevant to the charge
of possession of methamphetamine. As such, the district court’s subsequent ruling that
the evidence was “part of the same act, same scene” and “part of the entire picture” was
improper because the State never provided an additional offer of proof to address the
district court’s initial concerns. Therefore, based on the State’s offer of proof at the time
of admission, the district court should have excluded the marijuana evidence as
irrelevant. See Seitter, 127 Idaho at 358.
Second, even if the State’s offer of proof was sufficient, the marijuana evidence
was not relevant to any issue other than Mr. Gomez’s criminal propensity. The mere
presence of one drug is not relevant to show the knowledge or possession of another.
That is nothing more than propensity evidence. Whether Mr. Gomez knowingly
possessed methamphetamine is not made more or less probable based on the
presence of marijuana, absent an assumption of criminal propensity. Thus, the
presence of marijuana in a backpack in the vehicle’s trunk was irrelevant, and the
district court erred by admitting this evidence.
Even if Mr. Gomez had some knowledge of the contents of the backpack, any
knowledge of that marijuana does not make it more or less probable Mr. Gomez had
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knowledge or control of the methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals has recognized
“the possession of other contraband or cutting agents” could be used as circumstantial
evidence to show the requisite knowledge and control to prove constructive possession.
Southwick, 158 Idaho at 178. But here, there was no evidence that Mr. Gomez had any
knowledge of the contents of the backpack. Mr. Gomez repeatedly denied knowledge
and possession of the marijuana. (See State’s Ex. 2, 20:08–26:26.) Thus, the marijuana
evidence only showed Mr. Gomez’s propensity to commit a drug offense, an
impermissible purpose under I.R.E. 404(b). See Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 230 (“Merely
because [the defendant] dealt smaller amounts of methamphetamine in the past does
not lead to the conclusion he knew there was a pound of the substance under his car
seat. Thus, the statements were highly prejudicial.”). Therefore, the district court erred
as a matter of law by admitting the marijuana evidence.
Finally, the State cannot prove the admission of the marijuana evidence was
harmless error. Because Mr. Gomez objected, (Tr. Vol. I, p.43, Ls.12–21), the State has
the burden to prove the admission of the evidence was harmless. Joy, 155 Idaho at 11.
“To meet that burden, the State must ‘prove[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Id. (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2010));
see also Idaho Criminal Rule 52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”). The State cannot meet its burden to
show harmless error in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Gomez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
judgment of conviction and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 29th day of September, 2016.

___________/s/______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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